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 Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility: 
 
 Then the police officer told the suspect, without just cause, 
 “I bet you are hiding [drugs] under your balls. If you have drugs 
 under your balls, I am going to fuck your balls up”1 
 
 Bernard E. Harcourt2 
 
Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski document astonishingly high rates of uncon-
stitutional police searches in their groundbreaking article “Suspect Searches: Assessing Police 
Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution” published in Criminology & Public Policy (2004). By 
their conservative estimate, 30 percent of the 115 police searches they studied—searches that 
were conducted by officers in a department ranked in the top 20 percent nationwide, that were 
systematically observed by trained field observers, and that were coded by Gould, Mastrofski 
and a team including a state appellate judge, a former federal prosecutor, and a government 
attorney—violated Fourth Amendment prohibitions on searches and seizures. 
The vast majority of the unconstitutional searches—31 out of 34—were invisible to 
the courts, having resulted in no arrest, charge, or citation. In fact, the rate of unconstitutional 
searches was highest for suspects who were released—44 percent versus 7 percent of arrested 
or cited suspects. Focusing exclusively on stop-and-frisk searches, an even higher 
proportion—46 percent—were unconstitutional. Moreover, 84 percent of the searches 
involved black suspects. The searches were conducted and observed in the early 1990s in the 
midst of an ongoing war on drugs, during a period of increased police discretion nationwide. 
The study paints a troubling picture of police practices and raises a number of difficult 
questions about discretionary policing.  
Gould and Mastrofski’s findings have a disturbingly familiar ring to them. In a 
somewhat analogous context—stop-and-frisk searches conducted in New York City during 
                                                           
1  Jon B. Gould and Stephen D. Mastrofski, “Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior,” 
Appendix—Sample Search Narratives and Coding, Criminology & Public Policy __:__ (2004) (this is an 
excerpt from field notes recording a conversation between a police officer and a suspect). 
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the late 1990s—research similarly revealed high levels of unconstitutional searches. New 
York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, in conjunction with Jeffrey Fagan and Columbia 
University’s Center for Violence Research and Prevention, reviewed documentation of more 
than 15,000 NYPD stop-and-frisk reports, and found that, citywide, 15.4 percent of the 
reports contained factual bases that were not sufficient to justify a stop and another 23.5 
percent stated inadequate factual bases to allow a supervisor to determine whether there were 
sufficient facts to justify a stop—for a total of approximately 39 percent questionable 
searches.3  
To be sure, Gould and Mastrofski have raised the evidentiary bar with their article 
Suspect Searches by drawing on one of the first studies to conduct systematic physical 
observation of police searches. Rather than being based on written police reports—which 
raise clear issues of reliability—their new findings are drawn from the field notes of trained 
observers who accompanied and directly observed police officers on patrol. Any bias in this 
method—specifically, reactivity effects from direct observation of police practices—would 
likely tend to minimize a possibly higher real rate of unconstitutional searches.4 Nevertheless, 
Gould and Mastrofski’s empirical findings corroborate overall Spitzer’s conclusions: about a 
third of police discretionary searches are constitutionally suspect.  
The public policy debates that Gould and Mastrofski’s article are likely to ignite will 
also, in all probability, have a familiar ring to them as well. The debates have been rehearsed 
in a number of policing controversies—not just stop-and-frisk policing on New York City 
streets,5 but also racial profiling on the nation’s highways6 and drug-courier profiling at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2  Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 
3  See Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the New York Attorney General, The New York City Police 
Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practice: A Report from the Office of the Attorney General  (December 1, 
1999), at pp. 160B170. 
4  In addition, Gould and Mastrofski bent backwards to minimize the risk of overstating the rate of 
unconstitutional searches by reading any factual and legal inferences in favor of the police while coding and 
consistently giving the police officers the benefit of any doubt in the coding process.  See Gould and 
Mastrofski 2004:*19. 
5  See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City 
(August 2000); New York Police Department, NYPD Response to the Draft Report of the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights—Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City (2000); Heather 
MacDonald, “America’s Best Urban Police Force,” City Journal, Volume 10, No. 3 (Summer 2000).   
6   See Jerome Skolnick and Abigail Caplovitz, “Guns, Drugs and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and 
Minimize Racial Profiling,” in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America (Bernard E. Harcourt, ed.) (New 
York: New York University Press 2003); Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, “Road Work: Racial 
Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” Michigan Law Review, 101(3):_____ (2002);  John 
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airports and borders.7 Civil-liberties-attentive law enforcement officials will probably call 
for more dialogue and research “in the best spirit of public policy discussion—without 
rancor or recrimination,”8 as Attorney General Spitzer recommends in the NYPD context. In 
this vein, there will also be calls for more “robust scholarly discussion and debate” over 
topics such as the “training of managers, supervisors, and line officers regarding ‘stop & 
frisk’” and the “methods for supervising officers who apply the technique on the street.”9  
Staunch law-and-order advocates will challenge the findings and place them squarely 
in the larger context of crime reduction. As Heather MacDonald of the Manhattan Institute 
suggests in the New York City context, these types of studies and the press more generally 
“specialize[] in blissfully ignorant innuendos about stop and frisks to tar the [police].”10 Or, 
as former New York police commissioners William Bratton and Howard Safir argue in the 
NYPD context, any apparent problem with unconstitutional searches can be attributed to 
sharply increased rates of civilian-police contact associated with heightened discretionary 
policing and growing police forces. On a per contact basis, the numbers are very low.11  
Civil rights organizations, such as the United States Commission on Civil Rights, the 
ACLU, and Amnesty International, will call for an end to unconstitutional searches and 
racial profiling, enhanced monitoring and training, better recruitment, and increased 
resources for the Civilian Complaint Review Board.12 Progressive academicians may call for 
an outright ban on discretionary stop-and-frisk policing or its replacement with mandatory 
randomized searches, and other more radical scholars will question the very idea of criminal 
profiling.13 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, “Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 109(1): 203B229 (2001).  For an overview and assessment of the empirical 
studies and policy arguments, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, “Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique 
of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature and of Criminal Profiling More Generally,” 
University of Chicago Law Review, 71: _____ (forthcoming Fall 2004). 
7  For discussion of the drug courier profile and its public policy implications, see generally Bernard E. 
Harcourt, “From the Ne’er-do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial 
Model in Criminal Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 66(3):99B151 (2003). 
8  Civil Rights Bureau 1999:175. 
9  Civil Rights Bureau 1999:176. 
10  MacDonald 2000. 
11  See William Bratton with Peter Knobler, Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime 
Epidemic, 291 (New York: Random House 1998); NYPD Response to the Draft Report 2000:7.   
12  See, e.g., United States Commission on Civil Rights 2000:82B39B40, 80B84, 107B108.   
13  My colleague at the University of Chicago, Tracey Meares, is working on a paper that argues 
against discretionary policing and in favor of non-discretionary type searches, such as mandatory road 
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These positions in our public policy debates are familiar. If anything, a bit too 
familiar. In this essay, I would like to reframe the debates and in the process destabilize these 
positions. To make them a little less comfortable, a little less sanitized. To start to expose the 
real stakes. To begin to explore our own responsibility as observers, as social scientists, as 
commentators, as policy makers, and, yes, as public citizens. In effect, I would like to probe 
our own participation in these police searches. Buried in the Appendix to Gould and 
Mastrofski’s article is a field note about one particular police-civilian encounter that raises 
especially troubling questions about social science, public policy, and citizenship. Let’s start, 
then, with this field note in the Appendix. 
 
 I. 
The lead police officer is described in very generic terms. He is a “white cop in his 
late twenties.” Three other police officers are assisting him on the scene, only one of whom 
is identified, also in generic terms, also as a “white male in his late twenties.” The officers 
have stopped a suspect who was riding a bike. The suspect is identified in the field notes, not 
surprisingly, as “a black male in his late twenties.” The police have searched his pockets, his 
person, his backpack. They have not found anything—no drugs, no gun, no contraband. No 
evidence of crime. Nothing. But they decide to search a little further. They decide to look a 
little deeper. They decide to check under his testicles.  
According to the trained field researcher physically observing the encounter, the 
young white police officer tells the young black suspect: “I bet you are hiding [drugs] under 
your balls. If you have drugs under your balls, I am going to fuck your balls up.”14 The 
police officer then tells the young black suspect to “get behind the police car, and pull his 
pants down to his ankles.” The white police officer puts on “some rubber gloves.” He then 
begins “feeling around” the black suspect’s testicles. Again, he comes up empty handed. No 
drugs. No contraband. Just a black man’s testicles. So he decides to search even further.  
And he says to the black man, now with even less valid suspicion: “I bet you are 
holding them in the crack of your ass. You better not have them up your ass.” The black 
                                                                                                                                                                             
blocks.  For a paper challenging the very idea of criminal profiling, see Bernard E. Harcourt, “Rethinking 
Racial Profiling,” (2004). 
14  Gould and Mastrofski 2004.   
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man, at this point very compliant, “bent over, and spread his cheeks.” The white cop, still 
with his rubber gloves, then “put his hands up C1's rectum.” [C1 is the anonymous code for 
the suspect—as in “Citizen 1" or C1 for short]. But the white cop finds nothing. No drugs. 
No contraband. Just a black man’s empty rectum.  
The citizen pulls his pants back up. The first cop on the scene tells him that he 
matched the description from a tip the police had received. [Note: “there was simply no 
evidence elsewhere in the report that the officers had ever received the call to which they 
referred,” Gould and Mastrofski observe. “Moreover, even if they had, an anonymous tip 
does not in itself justify a body cavity search (Florida v. J.L., 2000)”]. “Besides,” the officer 
adds, “you are so nervous, I would bet that you have some drugs on you too. But then again, 
I would be nervous too if I was surrounded by four cops.”  
The citizen repeats, for the fourth or fifth time, that he does not have any dealings 
with drugs, that “he didn’t use or sell drugs.” When he is told that he can leave, the citizen 
says “thank you” and takes off on his bike. For his part, the researcher walks back to the 
patrol car with the first cop on the scene, whose last words are “I know he had some drugs.”  
 
 II. 
It may be worth stopping here for a moment to experience this encounter in real time. 
On a conservative estimate—assuming, for instance, that the police officer had rubber gloves 
right handy—the strip and cavity search took at least ninety seconds. That is a very 
conservative estimate, and yet it is a long time in which to ruminate, day dream, think, 
desire. What must have been going through the officer’s mind when he started putting on 
those rubber gloves? Do you think that he felt bad that he was asking a grown man to drop 
his pants in public in order to feel his testicles? Do you think he was thinking to himself, 
“Man, I hate this job! I can’t believe I have to stick my hand up this guy’s ass.” Or did he 
feel entirely self-righteous, proud that he was so selflessly promoting the public interest? Or 
alternatively did he experience a genuine moral dilemma about having to employ dirty 
means to achieve good ends—what we might call, after Carl Klockars, “The Dirty Harry 
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Problem”15? Or was he just so convinced of the suspect’s guilt that he put all thoughts aside, 
that he wasn’t even thinking?  
Did he feel guilty in any way about the racial dimension of the encounter? Did he 
feel embarrassed about being white and putting his hands up a black man’s rectum? Or did 
that excite him? Do you think he experienced some pleasure at the idea of penetrating a 
black man? Of course, we do not know what he was thinking or feeling. We can only 
speculate. Do you think that he felt a spark, a frisson, some power, a feeling of domination 
when the citizen bent over in public and spread his buttocks cheeks for him? Do you think 
the cop experienced any sexual pleasure? Did he give it a good look? Was it a gentle caress 
or a punishing grip? Was he acting out some kind of fantasy? Was he hoping that the citizen 
might be complying out of a hidden desire to be dominated? Or instead, was the cop 
disgusted by the whole thing? Was it his disgust that attracted him to it? Was he punishing 
the black man? Was he intentionally trying to hurt him? (After all, wouldn’t it hurt to have 
someone stick a rubber glove up your rectum like that?) Was the cop inflicting this on 
himself—or on the citizen? Who was he punishing?  
What about the three back-up police officers? What were they thinking as they 
watched their white supervisor, their fearless leader sticking his hand up the black man’s 
rectum in public? Were they taking mental notes—”Okay, so this is how you do it. Let’s see 
now. Okay. Then you put your fingers up his ass.” Were they wondering to themselves 
whether their supervisor was nuts? Or a sexual pervert? Were they thinking of intervening 
and suggesting that there was no valid basis for further searching the suspect? Were they 
concerned that intervening might hurt their careers? Or were they envious—jealous that the 
supervisor got to penetrate the black man and not them. Were they bonding, as males, as 
delinquents? Was this some kind of initiation ritual? Was it any different than a gang 
initiation rape? Or was it a heroic act—after all, who wants to stick their hand up someone’s 
rectum to wage war on drugs? Or was this so routine that they didn’t even pay attention? 
Was it a cigarette break? A safe moment during an otherwise dangerous day? Or was it a 
moment of comic relief? Was it just some good old-fashioned healthy fun and games?  
                                                           
15  See Carl B. Klockars, “The Dirty Harry Problem,” 428B438, in Thinking about Police: 
Contemporary Readings, ed. Carl B. Klockars (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1983); see also 
Stephen D. Mastrofski and Craig D. Uchida, “On Dirty Hands and Definitions: A Rejoinder,” Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency 30(3):354B368 (August 1993).   
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What about the citizen, what on earth was he thinking and feeling? Do you think he 
felt humiliated about having to drop his pants in public? Or did he just think to himself, this 
is simply part and parcel of being a young black man in America today? What did he mean 
when he said “thank you”? Did it hurt? Could it possibly feel good? Had he done this 
before? Had anyone told him before what you are supposed to do if four cops stop you and 
tell you to spread your cheeks? Was he angry? Sad? Depressed? Forgiving? Vengeful? 
Understanding? Did he think to himself, “One day, white man, your time will come. I will 
get you back—when you least expect it”? How did he feel when he got home that night? 
What did he tell his kids? What did he do to his sex partner?  
What about the trained social scientist, the observer, the researcher there on site, 
taking field notes, conducting systematic observation? What was s/he thinking as s/he 
observed the police officer “put his hands up C1's rectum”? Did s/he take a good look? Was 
s/he curious as to how a police officer searches someone’s balls? Or did s/he close her/his 
eyes and think “My God, what is going on here?” Did s/he experience anger? Attraction? 
Repulsion? Arousal? An adrenaline rush? Did s/he try to intervene and tell the police officers 
that there was no evidence of a tip? Or that a tip would not justify such an intrusive search 
anyway? Was s/he concerned that this would jeopardize the data collection? Or was s/he 
projecting being the police officer, having the power, taking control, putting a hand up C1’s 
rectum? 
 III. 
The questions abound. And they all tend toward one central inquiry: to what extent 
are these various actors responsible for the cavity search? Of course, the lead police officer 
bears much responsibility. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Gould and Mastrofski 
conducted qualitative review of the worst offenders and found that “None appeared to be 
angry, cynical, or the composite of a disillusioned officer with an axe to grind.” “All were 
well regarded by their peers and supervisors and expressed a desire to establish strong bonds 
with neighborhood residents and to treat all citizens, including suspects, with a respectful 
demeanor.”16 (We might ask here whether the police officers had voluntarily segregated into 
these cohesive units and whether their strong peer bonds actually hid sharp tensions along 
                                                           
16  Gould and Mastrofski 2004:*35 
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other dimensions. In the policing context, for instance, there is a lot of voluntary racial 
segregation of police units).  
What about the responsibility of the other police officers watching? Should they have 
said something to defuse the situation—something like, “Hey, Sergeant, there ain’t nothing 
here! Let’s let the guy go! We’ll get him next time!” Why didn’t they intervene? Were they 
worried about getting fired? What was their rank? How much job security did they have? 
What would lead them to place their own self-interest over the welfare of the citizens they 
are sworn to protect? At what point and at what cost did they lose their ideals?  
And did race play a role in the decision of the three back-up police officers not to 
intervene? Gould and Mastrofski surprisingly minimize the racial dimensions of these 
searches. They bend backward to emphasize the lack of a significant statistical relationship 
between race and the unconstitutionality of searches. “The absence of significant effects for 
wealth and race deserve special note, inasmuch as other research has shown these variables 
to influence justice outcomes,” Gould and Mastrofski write.17 But the fact is that eighty-four 
percent of their sample—96 of the searches studied—involved black suspects. Although we 
do not know the exact demographic breakdown for Middleberg, the fictitiously-named 
medium-size American city where the study was conducted—all we do know is that “many 
of the city’s residents were African American, and many experienced concentrated 
disadvantage”18—it is hard to believe that the police could reach 84 percent searches of 
black suspects without some racial profiling. Might that have played a role or contributed in 
any way to the passivity of the three other police officers? 
What about the social scientist who is witnessing, observing, and documenting this 
incident—taking notes, making a recording, memorializing the interaction? Is s/he 
responsible in any way for this incident? Does the social scientist have any obligation to step 
out of the scientific role and actively intervene? To breach the code of social scientific 
objectivity and prevent the search? Or to report it? Let’s put aside personal ethics for a 
minute and focus on the more formal institutional duties that the researcher may have had. 
There are, aren’t there, some legal responsibilities that attach here? Among social scientists, 
it might be worth pausing here for a moment and exploring the question. 
                                                           
17  Gould and Mastrofski 2004:*32. 
18  Gould and Mastrofski 2004:*12. 
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Without doubt, the actions of the police officer involve bodily harm to the suspect. 
They are physically injurious, dehumanizing, and degrading at least with regard to one of the 
subjects of the research. In fact, the police conduct may well constitute a felony. In a number 
of jurisdictions, sexual battery includes anal penetration of another by any object without 
that person’s consent.19 This is precisely the statutory definition in Florida for instance, see 
Fla. Stat. '794.011(1)(h) (2004), where it is specifically designated a felony in the first 
degree “when the offender is a law enforcement officer. . . and such officer . . . is acting in 
such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe that the offender is in a position of 
control or authority as an agent or employee of government.” Fla. Stat. '794.011(4)(g) 
(2004). In Florida, it is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years for a first 
offense. Fla. Stat. '794.011775.082(3)(b) (2004).20 
Given that the actions of the lead police officer cause bodily harm—and may amount 
to a felony—the social scientist may very well have an obligation to report the incident to the 
university and to law enforcement officials.21 First, with regard to the university, the field 
observation study underlying the Gould and Mastrofski article undoubtedly required human 
subjects committee (IRB) approval at the university level. A project such as this, even 
though it involves only “observation of public behavior,” would not ordinarily be exempt 
from review because the disclosure of information beyond the research community “could 
reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the 
subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.”22 This is straight from the Code of 
                                                           
19  It will depend on the jurisdiction, of course, and we are not told where the fictitiously-named city of 
Middleberg is actually located.  I have chosen Florida purely hypothetically. 
20  In Florida, consent is defined strictly.  Consent requires “intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent 
and does not include coerced submission.”   Fla. Stat.§794.011(1)(a) (2004).  For prosecutions against 
police officers under (4)(g), “acquiescence to a person reasonably believed by the victim to be in a position 
of authority or control does not constitute consent, and it is not a defense that the perpetrator was not 
actually in a position of control or authority if the circumstances were such as to lead the victim to 
reasonably believe that the person was in such a position.”   Fla. Stat.§794.011(9) (2004).   
Another example would be California.  Under the California Penal Code, Chap. 5, §289, forcible acts 
of sexual penetration include, at section (k)(1), “the act of causing the penetration, however slight, of the 
genital or anal opening of any person . . . by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or by any 
unknown object.”  When the act “is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to use the 
authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a 
reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official,” then it is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison for a period of three, six, or eight years.  Cal. Penal Code §289(g) (2004).   
21  I have no idea whether the researchers did or did not report this incident.  I can only assume that 
they did, but I have no knowledge whatsoever.   
22  This is from the Manual of Procedures of the University of Arizona Human Subjects Protection 
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Federal Regulations concerning the protection of human subjects by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and is usually incorporated verbatim in 
university IRB protocols.  
As a result, the actions of the lead police officer would likely have to be reported to 
the university committee. The typical university approval requires as much. Here, for 
instance, is the actual text from a letter granting approval for a research project from the 
human subjects committee at a top American research university: 
 
Approval is granted with the understanding that no further changes or additions will 
be made . . . without the knowledge and approval of the Human Subjects Committee 
and your College or Departmental Review Committee. Any research related physical 
or psychological harm to any subject must also be reported to each committee.23 
 
The failure to comply with these requirements could very well lead to academic discipline.  
As an aside, it is worth remembering that the regulation of research concerning 
human subjects is no trivial affair. It had its origins in the Nuremberg trials. As the IRB 
Guidebook of the Office for Human Research Protections of the DHHS explains:  
The modern story of human subjects protections begins with the Nuremberg Code, 
developed for the Nuremberg Military Tribunal as standards by which to judge the 
human experimentation conducted by the Nazis. The Code captures many of what 
are now taken to be the basic principles governing the ethical conduct of research 
involving human subjects. The first provision of the Code states that "the voluntary 
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." Freely given consent to 
participation in research is thus the cornerstone of ethical experimentation involving 
human subjects. The Code goes on to provide the details implied by such a 
requirement: capacity to consent, freedom from coercion, and comprehension of the 
risks and benefits involved. Other provisions require the minimization of risk and 
harm, a favorable risk/benefit ratio, qualified investigators using appropriate research 
designs, and freedom for the subject to withdraw at any time. Similar 
recommendations were made by the World Medical Association in its Declaration of 
Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, first adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly in 
Helsinki, Finland, in 1964, and subsequently revised by the 29th World Medical 
Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, 1975, and by the 41st World Medical Assembly, Hong 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Program, Part 4.(2), but it is lifted directly from the Code of Federal Regulations concerning the protection 
of human subjects from the United States Department of Health and Human Services.  See 45 C.F.R. Sec. 
46.101 (b)(2). 
23  This is the actual text from a letter of approval for research at the University of Arizona.   
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Kong, 1989. The Declaration of Helsinki further distinguishes therapeutic from 
nontherapeutic research.24 
 
Now, in addition to the university IRB, the researcher who observed the improper 
cavity search may also need to report the incident to law enforcement authorities.25 In a 
number of states, it is a misdemeanor to fail to report a crime that exposes a victim to bodily 
harm. In Florida again, a person who “has reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has 
observed the commission of a sexual battery” and who has “the present ability to seek 
assistance for the victim or victims by immediately reporting such offense to a law 
enforcement officer,” but fails to seek assistance, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first 
degree punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to a year for a first offense. Fla. Stat. ' 
794.027 and '775.082 (2004).  
Should the social scientist observer have intervened or later reported this incident?26 
If s/he did not, was it because it would interfere with the research? Because it might have 
jeopardized this data collection? Because it might have prevented any further cooperation 
from this police department? Because it might discourage other police departments from 
allowing systematic observation in the future? Because it might impair our ability, as social 
scientists, to collect this information? Is the cavity search just the collateral damage 
inevitably associated with social science—the cost of knowledge? The cost of increasing our 
collective awareness about police practices? Did the researcher just sacrifice this black man 
for the betterment of social science and public policy?  
Naturally, these questions raise a host of issues regarding the potential conflict of 
interest that the researcher may have experienced during the cavity search—issues close to, 
though somewhat distinct from the “dirty hands” dilemma that Stephen Mastrofski, Carl 
                                                           
24  Protecting Human Research Subjects: Institutional Review Board Guidebook, “Introduction” 
(available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_introduction.htm). 
25  Here, for instance, is the actual text of a letter from a district attorney regarding a request for 
immunity for a research project: 
We have reviewed your request for confidentiality in your interviews with research subjects 
for the above study.  We agree to such confidentiality except where information may come to light 
about homicides, other serious crimes or crimes involving serious injury to others.  
Therefore, if your research subjects should admit to homicide or other serious offenses as 
listed in [the state’s penal code] or one involving serious injury to another, should this information 
be disclosed to us in any way, we would be required to act on the matter as we deem appropriate 
and proper. 
26  Again, I have no knowledge whether s/he did.  I am discussing this as a pure hypothetical matter.  
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Klockars, and others have debated.27 The “dirty hands” dilemma, in its purest form, presents 
a challenge when the social scientist makes public policy recommendations. It emphasizes 
that the researcher is responsible for any harm that the policies may produce. Here, we are 
dealing with a slight variation on the theme, one that focuses on an earlier point in time. The 
question here is whether the research itself presents a moral dilemma. Does the collection of 
data require complicity with the delinquent police conduct? Do we have to dirty our hands 
and not intervene so that we can obtain the data? And at what price? Do we self-censor our 
questions, our analyses, our conclusions so as not to alienate the police officer or the police 
department? Do we have to “get in bed” with the police so that they allow us to ride along 
and observe their daily practices? Did the researcher here stop her or himself from 
intervening precisely in order to maintain credibility with the police? And will this affect the 
way the social scientist goes about doing research in the future? Is this the cost of getting this 
data?  
And what about us—me the author and you the reader? What is our responsibility as 
consumers of this research, as users of this social science? What is my accountability as 
author of this essay discussing Gould and Mastrofski’s article? Am I taking advantage of the 
black suspect? Here we are, debating the study in an academic journal, gaining reputations as 
thoughtful scholars, taking positions as policy advisers—but are we just observing sexual 
humiliation and taking advantage of it? What are we feeling as we read the narrative? Are we 
shocked, amused, disgusted, angered, satisfied, pleased? Do we feel guilt about the racial 
dimensions? Does it confirm what we suspected? Or is there cognitive dissonance? Is it 
incredible? Unbelievable? False? Unfair? Do we take responsibility for the actions of the 
                                                           
27  There are, in reality, three “dirty hands” problems that we need to distinguish.  The first is the “Dirty 
Harry Problem” that Carl Klockars writes about (Klockars 1983).  This first problem concerns the use of 
dirty means by a police officer to promote a good end.  Then, second, there is the moral dilemma of the 
social scientist making policy recommendations: the fact is that the policy recommendations may create 
some harm, and in that sense the social scientist will have “dirty hands.”  As Lawrence Sherman explains, 
there are moral dilemmas when we apply social science to policy analysis.  “These dilemmas make social 
science a morally ‘dirty’ means to a just and good end—a less violent world.  It is a ‘dirty’ means because 
recommendations based on it may do some harm, even though the odds are against it.”  Lawrence W. 
Sherman, “Dirty Hands and Social Science,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 
30(3):362B364 (August 1993).   This is the “dirty hands” problem that Mastrofski writes about in his 
rejoinder (Mastroksfi and Uchida 1993).  The third is the one I am interested here: how police researchers 
may have to “get in bed” with the cops in order to obtain their data—how they might have to self-censor 
their questions and analyses for fear of being shut out of the data.  This is another form of “dirty hands” that 
has even more detrimental effects on the social science and policy analysis because it corrupts before 
anyone has the opportunity to formulate policy proposals.   
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police officer? Or do we assume that he was right—that the suspect probably had drugs on 
him, somewhere, maybe deeper?  
Are we—you and me—responsible in any way for this body cavity search?  
 
 IV. 
The answer is “yes”. Inevitably. We are responsible. We have chosen this cavity 
search and others like it. It is ours. After all, it does not come as a surprise, does it? It is not 
completely unexpected, not even surprising that the police would bend the constitution from 
time to time when conducting discretionary policing. We know it. We expect it. 
Discretionary policing comes at a cost—and we knew it from the beginning. It was 
embedded in the very idea. Recall the original Broken Windows essay. How was it, after all, 
that the police dealt with the disorderly? “In the words of one officer,” James Q. Wilson and 
George L. Kelling wrote, “‘We kick ass.’”28 As Wilson and Kelling explained elsewhere in 
Broken Windows, the police “rough up” young toughs, and arrest on suspicion.29 George 
Kelling adds, fourteen years later: 
Another officer in Chicago described in similar terms how he dealt with gang 
members who would not follow his orders: “I say please once, I say please twice, and 
then I knock them on their ass.” The officer meant it: although a courteous and 
generally congenial man, he had grown up in Chicago’s public housing 
developments and was not prepared to stand by and watch gangs terrorize his family, 
friends, and neighbors.30 
 
Order-maintenance policing comes with a heavy price tag. Stephen Mastrofski was 
one of the first to point this out. Writing as early as 1988, Mastrofski emphasized that “One 
of the most recent attempts to assess the impact of aggressive order maintenance indicated 
that it contributed to increased criminal victimization and citizen dissatisfaction, while fear 
of crime and residents’ perceptions of disorder remained unaffected.”31  
                                                           
28   James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” 
Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, 29B38, at p. 35.  For a lengthy discussion of this, see Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press 2001) at pp. 127 et seq. 
29    Wilson & Kelling 1982:33. 
30    George L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing 
Crime in Our Communities (New York: Free Press 1996), at p. 166.  
31  Stephen D. Mastrofski, “Community Policing as Reform: A Cautionary Tale,” 47B67, in 
Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality, eds.  Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofski, (New York: 
Praeger 1988), at p. 54.   
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In this sense, we choose our forms of disorder. We choose our crimes. By engaging 
in an aggressive war on drugs through discretionary stop-and-frisk strategies, for instance, 
we are choosing this sexual battery and others. We can estimate how many there will be. We 
can predict, using actuarial models, how many C1’s will have to drop their pants and spread 
their cheeks in public. It is a form of collateral damage that we can come to expect.  What we 
want most, of course, is to keep it out of sight and out of mind. To deliberately not know it. 
To not see it, not hear it, not think about it. It is, after all, extremely uncomfortable—
especially for the tender-hearted among us. But it is predictable. It is to be expected.  
In the end, we are responsible for this sexual battery. By setting our law enforcement 
priorities and opting for robust discretionary policing, we are choosing to have more of these 
cavity searches. We can effectively regulate these assaults—more so than other forms of 
deviance such as drug use or gun-carrying over which we have a little less control. Here we 
can regulate the amount. We can turn on more discretionary policing, and with it, more 
unconstitutional searches. We calibrate the amount of this crime. It happens under our watch. 
It is the product of our choice. We put our hand up C1’s rectum.  
The great illusion is that all we are doing is fighting crime. That crime is out there, 
that we know what it is, that we simply go after it. This is the deepest fallacy. The fact is, we 
make crime. We decide what to criminalize and enforce and in the very process we allow 
other forms of deviance to flourish. Unconstitutional police searches are, tragically, but one 
perfect example. We set our scope on the drug war, we let loose discretionary policing, and 
we inevitably produce a certain amount—a predictable amount—of improper searches, of 
sexual batteries, of bodily injury. Sure, we can try to limit them with improved training and 
more civility. But still, we know they are going to happen. We can even predict how many 
will happen. 
Discretionary policing involves a trade-off—a trade-off that we make with full 
knowledge. The most important thing in the public policy debates, then, is to decide, with 
eyes wide open and brutal honesty, how much unconstitutionality we are prepared to live 
with—how many sexual batteries of black suspects we are willing to perform. We get to 
decide. You get to decide. You choose our crime. So, how many of these cavity searches will 
you tolerate in order to pursue the goal of getting drugs off our streets? To get guns off our 
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streets? And remember, you can’t say “none” if you want the police to engage in proactive 
discretionary policing. You would be lying to yourself.  
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